In this interview, we are joined by political analyst Andreas Umland. Together, we examine why the debate over frozen Russian assets has become a critical test of Europe’s resolve. With most of these assets held in Belgium, Russian threats, divisions within the EU, and the obstructionist stance of Viktor Orbán are slowing down a decision that could directly affect Ukraine’s survival and the course of the war. Meanwhile, as peace talks gain momentum, Russia is intensifying its attacks, while the United States is quietly granting sanctions exemptions to key Russian banks. We analyze how these steps strengthen Russia’s economy, prolong the war, and undermine Ukraine—despite public promises to bring the conflict to an end.
— Some politicians, like the Prime Minister of Belgium, for example, talk about “safe guarantees,” even “watertight guarantees,” as he calls them, and seem to be looking for reasons not to act, if you ask me. How serious are these obstacles to effective support for Ukraine? While he is looking for watertight guarantees, Ukraine is literally looking for blood-tight guarantees. Is that what is happening?
— I hope this is only a temporary disturbance. One can perhaps understand that Belgium is more concerned than other countries because much of this money is held in Belgian banks, and Belgium fears retaliation from Russia. However, I would expect the European Union to support Belgium and to resolve this issue collectively.
I cannot imagine that Belgium has a fundamental principled objection. The more problematic case is Viktor Orbán, who is trying to block this with his voice in the European Union.
— Right. That is the larger issue. But let us talk about Belgium a bit more. Russia is threatening the heads of Euroclear and other official and financial institutions. Do you think that could stop EU leaders from doing what is right? Could intimidation lead them to drag this out in order to obtain additional guarantees or insurance from other EU countries or from the EU itself?
—In a way, one can understand that Belgium is more directly affected. But on the other hand, I cannot imagine that concerns about Brussels’ own security could truly block this process.
— There are many questions at the moment. Putin is clearly nervous. We have seen him publicly insulting European leaders, calling them piglets or young pigs. Is money really the only thing keeping Putin in power? Do these frozen assets matter that much? And if they are not just frozen but transferred to Ukraine, what happens then? Could that really create a shift for Putin?
— Yes, I think there is still hope in Moscow that this money can somehow be recovered. Putin has now found a partner in the United States on this issue. There were plans suggesting that the US and Russia might jointly use this money.
The key issue is that if the assets were transferred to Ukraine, the war would become much more difficult for Putin. He therefore has a very strong interest in preventing this, for multiple reasons. He is also exploiting this issue to divide the European Union.
The behavior of some European officials and politicians is short-sighted, because the consequences—even for countries like Belgium—could be far more severe in the worst-case scenario.
— There are obvious opponents like Orbán, and there are officials who appear intimidated. At the same time, during peace efforts, the United States is issuing licenses that exempt key Russian banks from sanctions. What does that mean?
— It suggests that there are negotiations and deals being made that we do not know about and can only speculate on. This is why these sanctions exemptions exist.
It must be said that such exemptions have also been granted by the European Union since the beginning of the sanctions regime, so this is not entirely unusual. Certain special interests sometimes intervene in a general sanctions framework.
In the case of the United States, however, it is possible that some deals directly involve Trump’s family or other pressure groups that have specific business interests in continuing certain types of cooperation with Russia.
— What consequences does this have for Ukraine—and for Europe? If Russian banks are effectively operating despite sanctions, what does that mean in practice?
— It means that the war will last longer. The Russian economy will be strengthened by such exemptions, and the overall cost will increase for everyone—especially for Ukraine, but also for the countries supporting Ukraine.
For the United States, this may no longer be seen as a major issue, because the US is no longer materially supporting Ukraine. The American weapons Ukraine receives are now purchased by European countries. This creates transactional interests that are no longer about war and peace, but about financial interests of certain powerful companies or individuals.
— How can this be explained to American citizens? If someone asked President Trump directly why, in the middle of peace efforts, Russian banks are being allowed to bypass sanctions, how could that be justified?
— These questions should absolutely be asked. Such exemptions contradict Trump’s election promise to end the war. In reality, they prolong the war.
We now have a paradoxical situation: intense communication and negotiation between Washington and Moscow, while the war is actually escalating. Russian attacks on Ukraine have become more severe during these negotiations. The actual result of Trump’s policies benefits Russia and prolongs the war rather than ending it.
There is a political theater being staged, full of talk about negotiations and compromise, while behind the scenes a very different reality is unfolding.
— You and I can see that clearly here in Kyiv. So what matters more for the United States: maintaining sanctions pressure, or openly making a deal? And let us separate this—what is better for America, and what is better for Donald Trump?
— I do not think Trump genuinely cares about Ukraine or Eastern Europe. What he wants is some form of peace that he can present as a personal triumph.
Because Russia is not giving in, pressure is now being placed on Ukraine to make concessions. Ukraine has little choice but to consider this pressure. The United States still has some leverage, particularly through intelligence sharing, which remains crucial for Ukraine’s defense.
What is puzzling is how American voters—Republicans and Democrats—view this approach. Opinion polls show that Americans want the US to support Ukraine and view Russia critically.
— Would it be fair to say that Trump’s actions are dividing the American nation—separating the presidency from “We the People”?
— Ukraine is one of the few issues in American politics that still unites Democrats and Republicans, according to the polls I have seen. Trump is acting against this majority opinion—not only among the public, but even among his own voters.
One can only hope that the ambiguous results of his approach will eventually be fully exposed and understood by American voters, politicians, civil society, and members of Congress, creating pressure on the White House to deliver real results—to genuinely support Ukraine rather than hinder it or secretly assist Russia.
— Let us hope transparency will prevail. My final question: how should Ukraine act in this climate of uncertainty?
— The key issue is the so-called “coalition of the willing”—those countries that have committed to supporting Ukraine. They must find a way to continue financial support. As far as I know, current funding is secured only until March.
After that, either the frozen assets must be used to continue civilian and military support, or alternative instruments must be created by this coalition. I am optimistic that this will happen. The coalition includes powerful and wealthy countries, and they should be able to resolve this issue one way or another.
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