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While Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts are often promoted as opportunities for investors and contractors, they are, in reality, a critical challenge to see if large-scale international aid can be handled transparently and efficiently.
The common image of rebuilding Ukraine tends to focus on construction sites and rebuilding damaged infrastructure — but this view is misleading. The true aim of reconstruction is not to restore the country to its pre-war condition, but to create a modern state that can function effectively in today’s geopolitical and economic landscape.
The upcoming Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome, set for July 10–11, 2025, must be more than a symbolic gathering. It should become a turning point for making key political, institutional, and legal decisions that will determine how successful Ukraine’s recovery will be in the years ahead.
Dive in this topic with Igor Popov, head of United Ukraine Think Tank, expert on political and security issues, in his article for The Gaze.
Firstly, Popov explains that Expectations for the Rome conference should go beyond simply announcing new financial commitments. For Kyiv, the 2025 Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) represents a pivotal opportunity for the West to demonstrate a clear long-term support strategy—not just funding to meet immediate needs, but also reliable systems to ensure sustained financial assistance and private investment over the next 5 to 10 years.
Two central themes will be highlighted. First, Ukraine’s reconstruction must be tightly linked to its path toward EU membership. International donors are encouraged to back essential reforms needed for accession, such as anti-corruption efforts, judicial reforms, and the development of transparent, efficient public procurement systems.
Second, effective investment insurance is crucial to cover military-related risks. Without such protections, major institutional investors will likely stay away, concerned about the threat of missile attacks or sabotage. Kyiv is counting on strong signals from the West—not just one-off pledges, but long-term commitments that ensure funding will remain stable, transparent, and accessible to both the government and private sector.
One issue the Rome conference cannot overlook is the fate of frozen Russian assets. Ukraine’s delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba, aims to achieve two main goals—first, to secure the regular transfer of interest earned on those frozen assets into Ukraine’s national budget.
Secondly, the author emphasizes that still, even the most generous commitments from Western countries will mean little if Ukraine does not first take the essential step of accurately assessing the full extent of the destruction. According to the Kyiv School of Economics, direct physical damage has already surpassed $170 billion—and this number continues to rise each month. But that figure only scratches the surface. A joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4) by the World Bank, the EU, the UN, and the Ukrainian government estimates that total recovery and modernization costs will exceed $520 billion over the next ten years.
This is because rebuilding isn’t just about restoring what was lost—it’s about redesigning infrastructure to meet modern demands. For instance, new roads built in Ukraine’s western regions should align with EU regulations, and repairs to the country’s damaged energy systems must take into account the possibility of future attacks.
That’s why Ukrainian officials reject the idea of “returning to 2021.” Rebuilding the old systems would only reinforce past vulnerabilities. Instead, the reconstruction process should drive the creation of a new economic model. This means developing industrial parks and logistics centers that can attract foreign investors—similar to the innovation hubs seen in Poland and the Czech Republic—while also supporting the relocation of Ukrainian businesses from frontline regions into safer, more stable areas.
Thirdly, political expert argues that In the end, no funding system can succeed without strong, transparent national institutions. The Recovery Fund set to be discussed in Rome must become a model of openness—not a “black box,” but a fully transparent platform like “Ukraine Recovery,” supported by accountable donor boards, regular oversight by Ukraine’s Accounting Chamber and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, and independent reviews conducted by international audit firms. Without such safeguards, even hundreds of billions in Western aid could be undermined by mistrust or corruption.
Ukraine now stands at a crossroads: it can either use this opportunity to transform itself into a modern European state—with updated infrastructure, a resilient economy, and robust institutions—or risk dragging out the recovery for decades by holding on to outdated Soviet-style governance and systemic inefficiencies.
Finally, Igor Popov concludes that the Rome conference marks only the beginning of a long and demanding journey—one where the credibility and execution of promises will matter more than the number of pledges made. Responsibility for success rests equally with Kyiv and with each Western government prepared to make political and financial commitments. In this light, URC 2025 is more than a policy event; it is an opportunity to prove that Ukraine’s post-war recovery can become not only a challenge, but a defining symbol of a new European future.
Read the full article by Igor Popov on The Gaze: Ukraine’s Reconstruction: A Test of Western Resolve and Domestic Reform
Read also: Is the World on the Brink of World War III?
