Nuclear Umbrella Without Washington. How the French Initiative Is Forcing Europe to Think About Its Own Strategic Deterrent

Against the backdrop of the erosion of American guarantees and the end of the era of arms control, Europe is beginning a painful transformation of its own security architecture.

Paris’s proposals to extend the French nuclear umbrella to allies are once again on the agenda, and the five-year Review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthens the structural framework for this discussion. Against the background of statements by the Trump administration about reviewing U.S. commitments to NATO and the Iranian-American conflict, European capitals are for the first time since the Cold War openly discussing their own nuclear architecture.

Read the FULL article by Anton Kuchukhidze, political scientist and foreign policy analyst, co-founder of the United Ukraine Think Tank.

As the expert notes, in his March 2, 2026 speech at the Île Longue naval base, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled the doctrine of “forward deterrence,” signaling a significant evolution in France’s nuclear posture. The doctrine envisions an increase in the number of warheads, the potential temporary deployment of delivery systems on allied territory, and the institutionalization of nuclear dialogue through dedicated steering mechanisms. On the same day, Paris and Berlin signed a joint declaration establishing a Franco-German High-Level Steering Group on Nuclear Issues.

This marks an unprecedented degree of doctrinal alignment between France and a non-nuclear ally — a level of strategic intimacy previously reserved for the United Kingdom. Initial steps include German participation in French nuclear exercises, joint visits to strategic facilities, and expanded cooperation in deep-strike and air-defense capabilities. Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Greece, and Denmark have already expressed interest in joining the dialogue, gradually transforming what began as a bilateral initiative into the nucleus of a parallel European deterrence framework.

Meanwhile, the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, as analyzed by the Congressional Research Service, notably omits explicit references to extended deterrence and emphasizes greater allied responsibility for self-defense, with more limited American support. The expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026 further deepened the strategic arms control vacuum. At the same time, statements from the Trump administration regarding potential troop withdrawals and negotiations over Greenland have eroded confidence in the reliability of U.S. security guarantees.

Kuchukhidze argues that a structural imbalance remains. As the Council on Foreign Relations observes, France’s approximately 290 warheads and the United Kingdom’s 225 are not designed for large-scale counterforce missions or damage-limitation strategies, whereas the United States maintains roughly 1,700 deployed strategic warheads. European deterrence, therefore, differs not only politically but also operationally.

The 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which opened on April 27 in New York, convenes under exceptionally strained conditions. The United Nations Association of Great Britain notes that Paris’s decision to expand its nuclear arsenal constitutes the first increase in a decade and departs from France’s previous self-imposed ceiling of 300 warheads.

Although the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed its commitment to full NPT implementation in its April 20 statement, the emerging model of European nuclear cooperation raises complex legal and political questions. Article I of the NPT prohibits nuclear-weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly. The institutionalization of a new form of nuclear sharing in Europe may test the boundaries of that provision.

Finally, the political scientist summarizes that for Kyiv, these developments carry direct implications. A structured European nuclear architecture would mean that long-term security guarantees for Ukraine will no longer be determined exclusively in Washington. Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw are gradually emerging as decision-making centers where the nuclear dimension is no longer taboo. The May NPT Review Conference will reveal whether Europe can reconcile its pursuit of strategic autonomy with compliance under the non-proliferation regime — or whether the political cost of nuclear evolution will prove too high for the continent.

Read the FULL article on The Gaze: Nuclear Umbrella Without Washington. How the French Initiative Is Forcing Europe to Think About Its Own Strategic Deterrent

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