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From strike drones to joint projects with Rheinmetall, Ukraine has already started transforming Western defense industries. What began as urgent wartime improvisation is now evolving into a long-term strategic requirement: integrating Ukraine’s defense sector into Western supply chains is no longer a matter of charity but a necessity for resilience against modern threats.
The full-scale invasion has demonstrated that global security can no longer rely on the illusion of “endless peace” or on diplomacy alone as a safeguard against aggressors. Europe and the United States have recognized that their defense production systems are ill-prepared for large-scale warfare. Shortages of ammunition, delays in air defense deliveries, and gaps in munitions supply have become problems as critical as the Russian military itself.
This is why Ukraine must become a key element of Western defense production chains. It is not just about sustaining Kyiv in the war but about a broader strategic goal—creating a joint infrastructure for collective defense capable of withstanding any crisis.
Read more in the article by Bohdan Popov, Head of Digital at the United Ukraine Think Tank, communications specialist and public figure.
Firstly, Popov argues that after more than three years of war, Ukraine’s defense industry has proven its capacity to design weapons that are reshaping the principles of modern warfare. From strike drones and electronic warfare systems to upgrades of Soviet-era hardware, Ukraine has turned into a testing ground for genuine battlefield-ready innovations. Top military experts in the U.S. and NATO are now analyzing Ukrainian advances in UAVs and artillery.
This expertise cannot be overlooked. Incorporating Ukrainian solutions into Western production chains means accelerating the ability of Western militaries to adapt to emerging threats—from large-scale drone assaults to missile strikes.
Practical examples of this integration already exist. One of the most notable is cooperation with the German conglomerate Rheinmetall, which set up several joint service hubs for armored vehicle repairs in Ukraine in 2023–2024. By 2025, the company had declared its readiness to localize production of Fuchs armored vehicles and potentially begin assembling Lynx infantry fighting vehicles.
Another example is collaboration with Britain’s BAE Systems, which opened a Kyiv office and is working on transferring artillery and ammunition technologies. Meanwhile, the Franco-Belgian company Thales is in talks about joint production of medium-range air defense systems, and Italy’s Leonardo is considering technology transfers for electronic warfare.
Secondly, the author explains that the war has shown that reliance on raw materials and components from third countries, especially in Asia, poses serious risks. China, which dominates global production of rare earth metals and electronics, could easily become a lever of pressure on the West. If the U.S. and EU seek genuine strategic autonomy, reducing this dependence is essential.
Bringing Ukraine into Western defense production chains offers a way to build a complete manufacturing cycle within the democratic world—from mining titanium, lithium, uranium, and graphite to producing drones, ammunition, and armored vehicles. Ukraine can serve as the vital link that allows the creation of a secure, closed supply chain without vulnerabilities.
The war in Ukraine has also become a stress test for global defense manufacturing. By 2024, the EU and U.S. together were producing around 1.2 million 155mm shells annually. In comparison, Russia was turning out 3.5–4 million shells each year in 2023–2024, supported by its domestic factories as well as supplies from North Korea and Iran. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s own production surged to about 1 million munitions of different calibers in 2025—up from fewer than 100,000 in 2021.
Finally, the expert summarizes that integrating Ukraine into Western defense production chains goes beyond simply aiding a country at war; it is about reinforcing the entire framework of collective security. For the EU and the U.S., it represents a chance to fill critical gaps in arms supplies, reduce reliance on vulnerable markets, and secure a partner that has already demonstrated its effectiveness against one of the world’s strongest militaries.
Ukraine’s experience, resources, and industrial capabilities could provide the missing link the West needs to transform its defense networks from slow and tentative to agile, resilient, and capable of rapid response. Incorporating Ukraine is not a distant benefit—it is an immediate necessity dictated by today’s geopolitical realities.
Read the full article by Bohdan Popov on The Gaze: Why the West Needs Ukraine in Its Defense Industry
