What role could European peacekeepers play in Ukraine\u2019s future, and how might it affect the balance of power? <\/p>\n\n\n\n
James Sherr<\/strong>, Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Defence & Security, offers his expert insights. We\u2019ll also uncover the realities of North Korean troop involvement in Kursk Oblast\u2014are they turning the tide for Russia or just cannon fodder? Don\u2019t miss this eye-opening discussion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 There have been talks about two major topics. The first one is North Korean deployments in the course of Russia and the quality of those soldiers\u2014their mere presence as a third party in this war. The second topic is the possibility of European peacekeepers\u2014not NATO or the European Union, just peacekeepers from European countries\u2014in Ukraine. What can you tell me about those two topics?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 First, about North Korea, there are several things to be said. Obviously, this is very useful to Russia, which\u2014like Ukraine, but in a different way\u2014is under considerable and growing pressure when it comes to manpower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The North Korean troops are, in very stereotypical terms, extremely well-trained. They are very physically fit, far better than the average Russian troops. However, they are not a game-changer in battlefield terms for all kinds of reasons: tactical, operational culture, language, and command culture, among others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the key point about them, if we look at this in a broader context, is that they should be a game-changer for the United States. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It is very puzzling to me\u2014and not only to me\u2014that they don\u2019t appear to be. The presence of North Korean troops fighting a war in Europe\u2014even in the European part of Russia\u2014is not seen as a dramatically unacceptable development in the United States, at least not yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Republican chairman of the House of Representatives’ Intelligence Committee wrote a letter to President Biden in which he highlighted what a significant departure this was\u2014what a significant red line had been crossed\u2014and how it was absolutely urgent for the United States to take immediate action. He even called for a classified, closed session of the committee with President Biden.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of course, this has not happened. But one of the key reasons why the United States ought to be very interested is that, obviously, Russia has given North Korea something in return\u2014and a considerable amount in return. They are giving them enormous technological assistance, particularly with their nuclear program, and that adds to all of the tensions and threats developing in the Far East and the East and South China Seas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, that is the main reason why their presence is so important.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 So, you\u2019re telling me that the deployment of these trained troops, effective or not, threatens United States interests both in Europe and in the Far East. Am I correct?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 Absolutely. This has been said by leading Republican members of the U.S. Congress. I haven\u2019t yet heard President-elect Trump say anything about this. The Biden administration has been very keen not to express its views\u2014whatever they are\u2014publicly. And I\u2019m not the only person who finds this puzzling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n My belief is that their departure from the entire theater of war, if not from European Russia altogether, should be made a precondition for negotiations of any kind.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n If you had told President Truman or President Eisenhower that, 70 years later, after the end of hostilities in the Korean War, North Korean troops would be fighting a war in Europe, they would have jumped out of their graves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 Well, there are Chinese troops stationed in Belarus. They\u2019ve been there lately for drills with the Russian and Belarusian armies. Can you see European armies stationed in Ukraine?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 This is a much bigger question. President Zelenskyy just had meetings with the EU, with a number of key European leaders\u2014those most strongly supportive of Ukraine. Of course, he does not confide in me personally, but even if he did, it\u2019s very early to know what his response to this meeting is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the basis of what I\u2019ve read, I find it very disappointing. One of the clear messages that seems to have emerged is that, in the absence of the United States, it is not realistic\u2014and for all intents and purposes not possible\u2014for Europe, or European NATO allies, to directly intervene in the war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, what is basically being said is that, in the absence of U.S. participation, when NATO speaks about defense or security guarantees, they are not speaking about proper defense guarantees. That is to say, a treaty to go to the defense of the country concerned\u2014Ukraine\u2019s defense. They\u2019re talking about assurances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 Assurances? Are we talking about the Bucharest Memorandum in different variations?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 Precisely. We know this is completely inadequate. This is why Zelenskyy himself has said that nothing less than a guarantee from the United States will suffice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But it shouldn\u2019t be this way. The starting point of realism in Europe has to be that we cannot count on the United States to always be present. We must do things ourselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A coalition of the willing\u2014a number of states, including Estonia, for example\u2014needs to devise practical measures to assist Ukraine directly, even in the absence of U.S. participation. This could, incidentally, become a major source of leverage on the United States, which might welcome such efforts\u2014or they might not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But we need to act in the West\u2019s interests and Europe\u2019s interests, not only in Ukraine\u2019s interests. That means taking risks. If we say, as we often do, that if Ukraine is defeated by Russia, the risks to Europe will be greater than if we do what is necessary to defeat Russia, then we\u2019re contradicting ourselves if we don\u2019t put ourselves in a position to support Ukraine directly\u2014even without the U.S.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 That seems strange, given that the combined economies of the EU and the UK are far greater than Russia\u2019s GDP. European economies are centered on cooperation, capital, and producing goods for people\u2019s lives, while Russia\u2019s economy is focused on military\u2014offensive, not defensive, technologies. Isn\u2019t it time for Europe to centralize at least part of its economy on defense?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 What you\u2019re saying underscores a basic truth: wars are not won or decided by GDP ratios. They\u2019re decided by the conversion of national attributes\u2014technological, economic, social, psychological, and military\u2014into usable military power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is understood by most NATO countries that this is true. But our societies and political systems have been oriented for generations in profoundly different directions. Changing this requires a systematic approach and real steps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There have been steps taken, particularly in the Baltic region. Denmark, for instance, significantly increased its defense budget only eight months ago, but now they\u2019ve concluded it\u2019s still inadequate and are planning something more ambitious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We all need to go through this process. It requires leadership and an understanding that the alternative priorities of most citizens and voters may not be addressed in the way they want.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 And yet, many in Europe may not recognize that we are in a pre-war period.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 Precisely. The Chief of the British Defense Staff said more than a year ago that we are in a pre-war period. He understands this; I understand this; Ukrainians understand this. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The question is: how many decision-makers in Europe truly understand it? And of those who do, how many are prepared to take the risks and practical steps consistent with that understanding?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I doubt very much that President Zelenskyy was pleased with what he heard in Brussels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 I see two trends in Europe. In some countries, election campaigns focus on preparation for possible future wars, like in Germany. In others, like Romania, candidates promise peace with Russia rather than preparing for conflict. Who will win, in your opinion?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 It depends on the country. The West is not one entity; it is many.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is why Russian leadership is so confident they are winning this war\u2014and even nearing the end of it. The big question remains: what will Donald Trump do?<\/p>\n\n\n\n He believes he can end this war soon, though perhaps not in 24 hours. But he cannot. Putin has no interest in ending the war. Fighting is Russia\u2019s only leverage over Ukraine and Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We have mutually opposed, antagonistic interests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The real question is whether Trump will understand that the problem in any peace negotiation is Russia, not Ukraine.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n If he does, what will he do? Will he provide Ukraine with everything it needs, as he has hinted at? Or will he walk away entirely? We simply don\u2019t know yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
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