Kursk Operation is a hybrid operation as it most certainly had its military impact as well as political one. Permission to strike deep into Russia\u2019s territory: any attempt to appease dictator is only leading to the obvious – Putin gets more impudent, and that leads to new escalation and more killings in Ukraine, like the recent glide bomb Kharkiv. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Toropets and Tikhoretsk – russian military depots on fire, also fired are those russian generals in charge of this facilities safety, they are in jail charged in embezzlement – usual russian everyday routine, nothing new. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This topics were observed in an interview with Ben Hodges,<\/strong> Former US Army Commander in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 First, Kursk operation. Militarily and politically, because obviously, it’s a hybrid operation of sorts. It most certainly had a military impact as well as a political one. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n What have the Ukrainian forces actually achieved in a month and a half of Kursk action, militarily and politically?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 I think it’s too early to say exactly what was fully accomplished. We don’t know how much longer the Ukrainian General Staff plans to conduct operations in the Kursk direction, but I see three main takeaways so far.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Number one, it changed the narrative about the inevitability of a Russian victory. Ukraine has shown it can defeat Russian forces and even go into Russia. This is an important shift in the war’s narrative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second thing is that it has created a dilemma for the Kremlin. The Kremlin now has to decide whether to eliminate the Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk direction or keep its focus on other areas like Pus and Vladar. This poses logistical and domestic challenges for the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The third and perhaps biggest takeaway is that Ukraine proved what many assumed would be a red line\u2014going into Russia\u2014has not led to the escalation people feared. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The Russians have not escalated to using nuclear weapons, and Ukraine has called their bluff. We should stop deterring ourselves out of fear of Russian escalation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 It isn’t a victory yet, but we may have a plan\u2014Zelenskyy’s plan, a victory plan for now, at least the military part. I\u2019ve spoken to Ukrainian soldiers who are somewhat pessimistic about its viability. How likely is it that partner states will join Ukraine in implementing this?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 It\u2019s normal for soldiers to feel a range of emotions, especially after fatigue, loss, and doubt. However, their perspective might not always align with the strategic direction of the war. What\u2019s important for Zelenskyy\u2019s victory plan is whether the U.S., Germany, and other nations like the U.K. provide the necessary means for Ukraine to defeat Russia and push them back to the 1991 borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unfortunately, based on the statements from President Biden and Chancellor Scholz at the UN General Assembly, neither seems ready to take the next step in allowing Ukraine to use long-range precision weapons inside Russia. This reluctance could lead to long-term regret.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 I was going to ask about permission to strike deeper into Russian territory with Western arms. How likely is that, and when might it happen?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 Two weeks ago, there was a sense that it might happen. But President Biden made it clear that it would not, and Chancellor Scholz expressed personal convictions against it. This is damaging to the credibility of the German government and President Biden\u2019s legacy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Although Biden has done a lot to unite nations in support of Ukraine, he\u2019s stopped short of what\u2019s necessary for Ukraine to win. He can\u2019t even say, \u201cWe want Ukraine to win.\u201d Instead, he keeps saying, \u201cWe\u2019ll be with you as long as it takes,\u201d which means nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 Ukraine isn\u2019t waiting for permission. They\u2019re working on their own means to deliver long-range blows to the enemy. But if Ukraine uses its own weapons like Pani missiles, Russia may claim they are American weapons. How would the West react?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 We should stop worrying about what Russia claims. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia needs the narrative that it’s fighting NATO, not just Ukraine, to explain its colossal failures. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Ukraine has the right under the UN Charter to defend itself, and it\u2019s not going to wait for us to deliver what\u2019s needed. Ukraine is already making Russia pay through strikes on ammunition depots and oil and gas infrastructure. The U.S. will eventually have to correct its policy, though this might only happen after the election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 Let\u2019s discuss Russia\u2019s failed nuclear tests. Some say Russia\u2019s nuclear arsenal is outdated and poorly maintained, while others argue that even one nuclear strike would be devastating. Should we assume Putin\u2019s nuclear arsenal is ready?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2014 While Russia does have thousands of nuclear warheads, I find it extremely unlikely they would use one. The costs would be catastrophic\u2014economically, internationally, and militarily, especially considering a potential U.S. counterstrike. The real benefit for Russia is in the threat of using nuclear weapons, which works against the U.S. and Germany. <\/p>\n\n\n\n We are making a strategic error by letting Russia’s threats deter us.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n\n
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