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On 28 February 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, under pressure from the Russian Armed Forces, voted for holding the so-called “referendum” on the status of Crimea. On the same day, units of the armed forces of the occupying country started blocking Ukrainian military units on the peninsula. The Belbek and Simferopol airports were seized and land entrances to Crimea from mainland Ukraine were taken under control.
However, there are still open questions as to why in 2014, when the “green men” had already virtually occupied Crimea, the Ukrainian authorities declared that the Ukrainian army was incapable of engaging in an armed conflict with the enemy.
Thanks to the transcript of the meeting of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) of February 28, 2014, we today have the opportunity to better understand the circumstances that led to Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian Crimea.
At that time, at an emergency meeting of the NSDC, acting Defense Minister Ihor Tenyukh said that “today we will be able to gather from all over the country a military group of more than 5,000 servicemen capable of performing combat missions. We can throw them into Crimea, but this will not solve the problem of the peninsula.”
In my opinion, the appointment of Tenyukh to this position is a huge mistake, which we have been trying to correct all these years of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Let’s start with the fact that the appointment of Tenyukh was made on the basis of political quotas of the Freedom Party. The man had no practical managerial experience – this was a huge mistake, given the trends that were already taking place in Crimea.
As for Tenyukh’s statements, we should start not with his assessment of the concentration of Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders, but with his assessment of the AFU’s combat capability. According to him, at that time there were more than 20,000 Russian troops in Crimea against 1,500-2,000 Ukrainians ready to carry out the order to use weapons.
Tenyukh actually officially told the enemy at that time that we have a limited number of combat-ready troops. It is nonsense when a country’s defense minister comes out and says that we have no one and nothing to defend ourselves with. Russia realized that there would be no serious resistance. With his statements, the then Minister of Defense of Ukraine actually pushed Russia to occupy our territories.
Speaking in court in the case of Viktor Yanukovych, Tenyukh quoted the words of Stepan Poltorak, who at the time headed the National Guard and, according to Tenyukh, also participated in the meeting of the National Security and Defense Council.
“Immediately after me, Stepan Poltorak spoke. He said verbatim: “I propose to withdraw our units from Crimea with proudly raised flags,” Tenyukh said.
Poltorak reacted to these words, calling Admiral Tenyukh’s comments “inadequate” and himself “frightened”. He recalled that at that time he was not yet a member of the National Security and Defense Council.
All the stories that Ukraine was not ready to fight back do not correspond to reality. A sufficient number of combat-ready troops were concentrated in Crimea. The question is that there was complete disorganization.
Ilmi Umerov, a member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and a former prisoner of the Kremlin, agrees with this statement:
“Out of 300 military units in Crimea, perhaps 10-20 could have come out at least with a fight. If you are attacked, you should at least protect your military unit. The orders were of the opposite nature: do not interfere, do not offer any resistance, do whatever they say.
Umerov puts the responsibility for the lack of resistance on the then speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, who was acting president, Oleksandr Turchynov.
“The fact that this ‘bloody pastor’ was acting president for only the third day does not remove the blame from him. Especially, at the meeting of the National Security and Defense Council he was in favor of giving an order to act according to the statute, although the army does not need such orders”, – recalls these events in an interview with the news agency Qirim.News Ilmi Umerov.
All the talk about the order of strategic partners in Crimea, where they say that it is not worth provoking the Russian Federation – this is evidence of a state crime. The Minister of Defense took an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. Accordingly, his constitutional duty is to protect the territories of his own country. But no measures to counter the enemy were taken.
The first stage of hybrid warfare in Ukraine began with Crimea. Then Russian special services managed to incorporate the local government to be loyal to the Russian military occupation. It is from this period that we should start counting the mistakes of the military and political leadership of Ukraine, which prevented effective opposition to Russian aggression.
First. On March 5, 2014, the Shevchenkivsky District Court of Kyiv ordered the detention of the “speaker” of the Crimean parliament, Vladimir Konstantinov, and the “prime minister” of the autonomy, Sergey Aksyonov. They were demanded to be taken to court to elect a measure of restraint.
With regard to Aksyonov and Konstantinov, the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies started criminal proceedings under part 1 of article 109 of the Criminal Code of the republic. Namely, “actions aimed at violent change or overthrow of the constitutional order or seizure of state power”.
On March 5, 2014, the Shevchenkovsky Court of Kiev issued a ruling, and already on March 7, a delegation from Crimea led by Konstantinov met with deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. And then talked to senators from the Federation Council. During the meetings, the “speaker” of the Crimean parliament promised to do everything possible to make the Ukrainian peninsula join Russia.
The fact that Konstantinov is flying to Moscow despite the ruling of the Shevchenkivskyy court and the investigation of the case by Ukrainian law enforcers is indicative.
I draw attention to the fact that the air corridor of the plane with the Crimean delegation of collaborators headed by Konstantinov was over the territory of Ukraine and was provided by the Ukrainian side. To put fighter jets in the air and land a plane with traitors on a Ukrainian airfield is a purely technical matter.
Despite the fact that the Shevchenkivsky District Court of Kyiv has ordered Konstantinov’s detention, the Ukrainian military is not reacting in any way. Moreover, they are giving a corridor both to Moscow and in the opposite direction – from Moscow. The military could only receive a decision or a command not to intervene in this case from the country’s top political leadership.
Accordingly, then the question arises that already on March 7, 2014 the fate of the Ukrainian Crimea was decided not in favor of Ukraine. And it was not the traitor Konstantinov who decided it. This is the first mistake and defeat of the then Ukrainian military-political leadership.
The second. The second key mistake is that only after the referendum in Crimea, namely on March 17, 2014, they announce partial mobilization. It is announced when it becomes clear that Putin claims not only Crimea, but also the eastern regions of Ukraine.
It was only on 17 March that an order was issued for the Ukrainian military to use weapons when attempting to storm Ukrainian units. I should like to draw your attention to the fact that this order contradicts the previous orders not to give in to provocations and not to open fire. As a result, we had a complete demoralization of the personnel, who simply did not understand what orders to follow.
Third. The refusal to introduce martial law in Crimea in February 2014 was the third strategic mistake.
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the failure to declare martial law and at the same time use the Armed Forces inside the country is a gross violation of Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the President’s obligations under Articles 102 and 106 of the Constitution, as well as Article 4 of the Law “On Defense of Ukraine”, which clearly says that in case of a threat of military aggression or real military aggression, the President must decide to use the Armed Forces, impose martial law and make a submission to the Verkhovna Rada to recognize a state of war. These are three key powers of the president that have been completely ignored.
Fourth. The then political authorities of Ukraine, which failed to resist the Russian occupiers in Crimea, could have organized resistance with the help of the local Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar population. This could have been done, in particular, through the mass distribution of firearms, as happened in Kyiv at the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion. This would help the pro-Ukrainian population to self-organize.
Given the size of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian populations, it would have been possible to talk about the normal functioning of the armed resistance. Unfortunately, this did not happen. This is another element of betrayal, which shows that territories are surrendered.
The question remains open as to why the employees of the Crimean departments of law enforcement agencies and special services did not defend the peninsula.
And the fact is that there was no one to protect. 90% of employees of special services turned out to be traitors. Ukraine does not act in this direction in any way, pretended that it just happened. Although they were supposed to counteract Russian aggression and suppress anti-state rallies. They did not do this because they themselves were involved in Russia’s actions. They were actually bought. All the time, the Security Service was not blocking the influence of foreign intelligence services, but was “roofing” illegal and legal business. Russia knew this very well and gave them the opportunity to continue their business by joining the FSB. The situation was the same during the seizure of part of Donbas.
Further results of the Russian-Ukrainian war follow from these mistakes.
In addition, I would like to add that the moment the Kremlin realized that it had the opportunity to move forward and receive no resistance to its actions – this was the signal for the “Russian Spring”, but already in the East of Ukraine.
At the same time, former Chief of General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2012-2014) Colonel General Volodymyr Zamana said in his memoirs in the treason trial of fugitive President Viktor Yanukovych that he considered the refusal to impose martial law in Crimea in February 2014 “a strategic mistake of the new government.”
According to Zamana, the root cause of Ukraine’s problems is not Putin’s imperial ambitions. He is just a vulture who seized what was lying around. And it was lying around precisely because no one in official Kiev was going to defend Crimea. Let’s remember how the new authorities divided portfolios from morning till night….
On March 21, 2014, the then acting Defense Minister of Ukraine Ihor Tenyukh said that without a command of the highest level, the army has no right to perform tasks of this level.
“For the Army to intervene, these politicians have to take the appropriate political decision. Then the Armed Forces will start acting! Now, without a political decision, the army has no right to perform tasks,” the acting defense minister said.
If the Ukrainian authorities had defended Crimea, there would have been no war in the east. The war in Donbas is a direct consequence of official Kiev’s inaction in Crimea.
The question of how to return the peninsula to Ukraine remains open
The process will be very difficult. Germany united after 50 years of Soviet occupation. France returned the lands of Alsace-Lorraine after 40 years of German occupation. Ukraine must act not only diplomatically, but also consider the military way.
According to the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, Kyrylo Budanov, the aggressor country seized the Crimean peninsula in order to turn it into a huge military base. This makes it possible to control most of Ukraine’s southern coast. He believes that it will be easier to return the occupied Crimea militarily than to reclaim the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
“From a military point of view, it is much easier to recapture Crimea than Donbass, where there is more than 1,000 kilometers of front and depth of more than 200 kilometers. There are two points of entry to Crimea – from the Russian side and from our side: the Crimean Bridge and the land isthmus. The question of reclaiming it is our front operations: from the Russian side – by destroying communications, from our side – by pressure. And then that’s it – Crimea is isolated,” Budanov emphasized.
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine officially declared the date of the beginning of the occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia as February 20, 2014. If “green men” had not been allowed into Crimea in 2014, Russia would not have invaded the territory of Donbass, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in an interview with Axios on HBO.
“If I had been president then, we would have all died there in Crimea, but we would not have let the “green men” there. And if we had not let the ‘green men’ in there, Russia would not have helped the separatists and would not be in eastern Ukraine,” Zelenskyy said.
Military-political analyst Dmytro Sniehyriov.
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