Yesterday at 20:08
More about the ongoing battlefield operations, Russian rolling advance and involvement of DPRK troops as well as burning spirit plants in Russia we will talk with Ivan Stupak – a military expert and a former Security Service of Ukraine employee.
— Lately, Ukraine has been targeting enterprises that produce alcohol and high-octane fuel for the Russian military. Can you explain why Ukraine has shifted its focus from ammunition depots to spirit plants?
— I’ll try to explain it this way: it might be easier to destroy spirit plants or alcohol production facilities than tank factories or other military enterprises. These are sensitive targets, and the payload of Ukrainian drones isn’t large – typically around 20 to 40 kilograms, not 100 or 200 kilos. This weight is sufficient to damage facilities like fuel depots or spirit manufacturing plants. I think that’s the main idea.
— We’re seeing constant Russian offensives in eastern Ukraine, especially in Donbas, with Russia gaining more territory each day. Are these strikes capable of stopping their momentum? Could they lead to fatigue for the Russians as they lose fuel and ammunition, making future assaults harder?
— Yes, by targeting fuel storage and distillate production, Ukraine’s strategy is to create significant issues for Russia’s budget. In 2025, Russia plans to allocate about 40% of its budget to national security and military aims, which totals around 150 billion euros. Russia’s budget isn’t unlimited, so destroying these enterprises harms the Russian economy and budget. Less production means fewer goods to sell and, therefore, less income for Russia’s economy.
— Regarding the Russian offensive, some analysts, including those at the Institute for the Study of War, believe it might soon slow down. Are you seeing any signs of this, or do you think they’ll continue advancing?
— Unfortunately, I don’t see it stopping. The Russian offensive has been ongoing since October 2023, without any significant pauses to redeploy or reinforce. In any standard military operation, an army would typically take breaks to prepare for the next phase. However, Russia has continued advancing without stopping for over a year, and nobody – not in Ukraine, nor even among Russian military analysts or journalists – can predict how long they’ll continue or what the outcome will be.
It remains uncertain whether this prolonged offensive will ultimately succeed or if Russia will exhaust itself.
— Russian casualties have reportedly been high, especially in recent months. Aren’t these losses slowing them down? It seems like they’re advancing, but their casualties keep rising.
— Yes, Ukrainian general staff report casualty figures daily, and the numbers keep increasing.
Currently, if I remember correctly, the figure is around 17,000 per month, which includes a mix of deaths, injuries, prisoners of war, and missing soldiers.
Russia has managed to incentivize people with high payments to join the war, with one-time bonuses as high as $31,000 – an amount most Russians would never make in a lifetime. This has enabled the Kremlin to find new recruits, but they’ve encountered more difficulties recently, leading them to seek manpower support from North Korea. According to Ukrainian intelligence, North Korean soldiers may soon be present in the Kherson region to participate in offensive operations against Ukrainian forces.
— The Kremlin might fear public backlash if they announce a general mobilization, as conscripted soldiers aren’t paid as much as contractors. Do you think this could lead to some social unrest in Russia?
— Yes, there’s a real concern. Even pro-Kremlin economists are nervous about mobilization because Russia’s current unemployment rate is below 2.6%, while a natural rate is closer to 3%. Lower unemployment indicates that certain industries are struggling to find workers, which would be exacerbated by general mobilization, potentially leading to economic collapse.
— That’s an interesting point. This could explain why Russia is looking to North Korean workers, not just soldiers, to fill roles in the military-industrial complex and other sectors.
— Yes, that’s the information available, though it’s difficult to confirm exact details. There’s speculation that North Korean soldiers and workers in Russia and occupied territories are there with no plans to return, possibly to support Russia’s military operations. Some sources, especially from South Korea and Western observers, suggest that these workers may have a one-way ticket to either Russia or occupied areas, with no expectation of going back to North Korea.
There’s also a possibility that these deployments aim to help North Korea develop expertise in modern warfare, such as the use of drones, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.
If so, they could bring this knowledge back to North Korea, enhancing their preparedness for any potential conflict with South Korea.
Read also: Glenn Grant: The Axis of Evil Grew Because of Western Weakness
