Today at 11:51
In this episode, military expert Frank Ledwidge joins us to discuss the game-changing role of F-16s and Mirage aircraft in Ukraine, the evolving dynamics on the frontline, and North Korea’s involvement in the conflict. Could Russia’s reliance on DPRK resources reshape global security? And is Putin’s “Oreshnik” a genuine threat or a strategic bluff? Dive into this critical analysis of the war’s latest developments.
— Pilots are successfully training on F-16 and Mirage planes. What is the role of these aircraft in the real battlefield situation on the front line?
— Well, I’ve always been quite negative about this compared with other commentators. I don’t see either airframe or aircraft—airplane—as a game-changer. They are both, the Mirage 2000 and the variants of the F-16 that Ukraine will be getting, late 1980s, perhaps 1990s technology.
The Mirage 2000 is no longer made. The F-16 variants are coming from Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. Also, I think Greece will be giving some variants in due course.
The important thing is what avionics are in it, and I would doubt that the avionics—meaning the electronics within the aircraft—are the latest models.
For the simple reason that the United States, which licenses this equipment, would not wish an aircraft to be shot down with this electronics over Russia, or indeed over southern Ukraine where Russian forces occupy.
I’ve always had my doubts about particularly the F-16 because it’s designed for high-level operations. It was designed during the early ’70s when it was really innovatory. The F-16 is probably the most successful—maybe the F-15—fighter plane ever made in terms of its combat record. But it was designed in the early ’70s to provide high-level defense against Soviet bombers in North America and, of course, for any other reason. It’s been a very successful strike aircraft as well.
But the aircraft I think will be much more useful for Ukraine is the Gripen, which I think Ukraine will get in due course when Sweden transitions to its new model. But nonetheless, these aircraft are probably, in the form that Ukraine is receiving them—and clearly there are secret elements to this—at least equal to the latest Su-34s, which are still being made, of course, and conceivably, depending on how they’re flown, even more advanced aircraft such as the Su-35.
But they are not a game-changer. They are fairly old technology. And of course, by the way, the important thing isn’t the airframe, as I indicated to you—the electronics, I’ve said—but also the weapon systems that are attached to it. And once again, the missile systems, which are the anti-aircraft missile systems that Ukraine is getting, are quite good. They’re AIM-9 late models, but they’re not the very latest missiles that, say, the Royal Air Force has or the French Air Force has. For the very good reason that if some of these missiles misfire and land intact, just as missiles have landed on Ukraine, that gives a big gift to enemy intelligence.
— The DPRK participation in hostilities and missile terror from Russia. Is there any reason to suggest that these tactics and strategy will change over time, when Russia will be about to join some post-negotiation efforts?
— Yes, I think there is. But they’re doing it in a way you would expect from Russia, which is to set out conditions that are untenable and unacceptable for Ukraine or anyone else.
The messaging—you’ll notice the messaging that the Russian state is putting out—is very strong. They’re not willing to start negotiations on anything that the West, Trump, or Ukraine may offer. So, for example, as you know, they are refusing outright any suggestion of a ceasefire on the zero line as it stands. No, they say, “We must have our four oblasts,” and that’s that.
Now, whether that’s true or not, we don’t know, but it’s a very strong negotiating position, and it’s messaged very consistently over a period of months. This is a problem for the West because, of course, Western negotiating positions are disorganized and inconsistent. The Russian negotiating starting position is highly consistent.
You’ll notice it was originally set out in June—I think June the 14th or 15th by Putin himself—and echoed again by Lavrov and others since. So there’s consistent messaging, very strong strategic communication backing up their negotiating stance.
The negotiating position of the West and Ukraine is not consistent or solid in the same way. There will come a time, I think, when Trump comes into power, and that changes. But until now, we see no sign of Russia agreeing to the start of negotiations, which, of course, as I indicate, does not in any way mean they will not do so. That’s their formal position.
And just one other thing, by the way, Paavo. I spoke—I’m very familiar with one of your leading experts on negotiation with the Russians—a Ukrainian diplomat, very senior diplomat. I had a long conversation with her about Russian negotiation techniques.
That tells me two things. First of all, you have experts who know all this in your diplomatic and military establishment, particularly your diplomatic establishment. And, of course, that Russian techniques are very familiar to them.
— We understand how Russia uses the DPRK resources in Ukraine. But how can Russia strengthen North Korea’s military industry, and how does it threaten global security?
— Yes, I think that’s absolutely correct, and you hit on the key point here. That while cash is very important for a very poor and primitive monarchy—that is, the absolute monarchy that is North Korea—far more dangerous globally is ballistic missile technology that Russia may be offering.
I have two particular examples in mind. The first is the construction of the missiles themselves. I have some familiarity with this. I worked on this in Iraq—on Iraqi ballistic missile technology. The shells of missiles are very difficult to build, even if you have space experience. So that’s the first thing.
But much more dangerous than that—I think North Korea has proven themselves fairly capable in building ballistic missiles, but they can be improved—or even space launch vehicles, which are very similar technology. Clearly, Russia has decades of expertise in that.
That’s one thing. But the second, and I think even more important aspect, is aeroshell technology. So the aeroshell—when you have a nuclear warhead or any kind of warhead that goes into the atmosphere and comes down again on a ballistic missile, as you know—the ballistics of this are that the missile fires, and then the warhead takes its own predictable route, sometimes with some precision.
One thing that North Koreans have found difficult is producing warheads that actually arrive at their target. The United States, until quite recently, assumed that many of their warheads would not arrive on target because the aeroshells were poorly built or the technology or materials were not available to them.
I suspect—no, I would think, I would expect—that one thing the North Koreans would be asking for, and probably getting because they are providing a great deal in terms of munitions and men, as you said, is this aeroshell technology to allow nuclear warheads from North Korean missiles to arrive at their targets with some accuracy.
That’s very dangerous, not just for the stability of the Western Pacific, but of course, the world more broadly. If Kim Jong Un believes, for example, that he now has a nuclear arsenal that will work for sure, as the Russian one probably would—certainly would—that changes some calculations and creates dangers that we can’t yet predict.
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