Yesterday at 19:56
The situation in Makiivka – what was it? You must have read on the Internet or seen on TV the news about the consequences of a strike by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on a college where the Russian Ministry of Defense has deployed its servicemen. And this is the FIRST TIME in the entire war when the Russian military leadership (albeit underestimating the scale) recognized the one-time death of so many of its servicemen.
And it is worthwhile to understand: what does it all mean? Is Kyiv changing its strategy? Will there be a new stage in the war, when strikes will begin not on warehouses, but – as the military would say – “on manpower”? And how will Moscow respond? Will it give Ukraine an advantage…or will it escalate the conflict even more?
New tactics?
Four hundred killed Russian occupiers – this figure is declared in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Moscow recognizes the fact itself, but at first they reported that only 63 people were killed; and a little later they ‘clarified’ – 89 casualties. And now we are not even talking about the numbers that Shoigu’s department will clearly underestimate. We’re talking about tendencies.
Analyzing them, Western experts are now writing that Ukraine is beginning to use new tactics – which are undoubtedly agreed with the allies (and primarily with the United States).
Kyiv has shifted in recent weeks from using the American-made rocket systems to hit ammunition dumps and supply lines to targeting barracks and other troop concentrations, – Michael Kofman, Director of Russian Studies, Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)
And in the first days of January, data from the Armed Forces of Ukraine appeared about two more such strikes and subsequent mass casualties – in the area of Fedorivka and Chulakivka in the Kherson region – when Russia’s losses reached 500 people.
And here it is important to note that in Moscow it has been reported about any significant losses only a few times during the entire war. During the battles for Hostomel or when the cruiser Moskva sank. But then it was about three dozen people – and even then, trying to let it all ‘slide’, when even the sailors were called missing for a long time, and having recognized the death, they did not connect it with the war. But now there are hundreds of casualties admitted.
And yes – the Russian Ministry of Defense had to report the hit of four HIMARS missiles (two more missiles, according to their data, were shot down) and promise to ‘sort it out and punish those responsible.’ What have they really been doing all this time? They obviously tried to agree on ‘acceptable’ losses and calculate how to mitigate the situation so that the stars do not fly off the shoulder straps.
After the successful operation of the Ukrainian army, the Russian military, as usual, began looking for a scapegoat who could be blamed. Putin will also be lied to again, – Ivan Preobrazhensky – expert on Central and Eastern Europe
But the reasons are important to understand. And not those that will eventually be announced officially. The real reasons. What is this? Wild miscalculation of the Russian military leadership, evidence of a loss of control, or a special operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
What they write in the Russian media – ‘they (the mobilised) called too much on mobile phones on New Year’s Eve – and this made it possible for the Ukrainian military to track the traffic and strike.’
Preliminarily, the reason for the HIMARS hit was the active use of mobile phones by the arrived military personnel. The enemy, using the ECHELON reconnaissance complex, revealed the activity of cellular communications and the location of subscribers.
In social networks, of course, users immediately began to write – they say, what kind of mobile phones? Upon arrival at the unit, mobile phones are taken away from the military. Yes, and using Russian SIM cards while roaming on the territory of Ukraine is very expensive. But here, apparently, the moment with the phones was ‘missed’; and placed the soldiers in a heap – in one room; Yes, and next to the ammunition depot.
One of the problems with relying on mobilized soldiers is that it is more difficult to disperse them because of a lack of small unit leadership, and they will do worse in the cold than trained soldiers. But housing them next to ammunition storage is simply a leadership failure, – Rob Lee, military analyst at the American Institute for Foreign Policy Studies
Why did the Russian air defense fail – the question is rhetorical since HIMARS was used (and this is also confirmed by the American Institute for the Study of War). But as for the goal, it’s not clear whether the traffic really gave away the location, or the locals. At least they talk about it in local telegram channels.
Makiivka is a small town, next to Donetsk and, accordingly, everyone can see who and what has appeared at the disposal camp. Especially when it’s a lot of troops and equipment. Even there, not everyone is pro-Russian.
That is, in any case, the blow was not at random, one way or another – it seems that for Ukraine it was a special operation, thought out and coordinated. That’s just interesting – is it a single operation? Or will a series of such actions follow?
Further and deeper?
Analysts of the American Institute for the Study of War are sure that the strikes of the Ukrainian army on Russian targets bring results to Kyiv. For example, they believe that the explosions at Russian airfields in early December seriously complicated the plan to deliver massive strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure. And here it is obvious that Ukraine – without officially confirming the attacks in the Russian rear – I will say this – “counts on their continuation.” This is the message of the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, who spoke with ABC journalists.
I think yes. They will go deeper and deeper, – KYRYLO BUDANOV, Head of Main intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in an interview with ABC News
And if this happens, then it will be a blow not even for the military, but for the Russians themselves. Those who have long believed (and perhaps still believe) that this is not a war at all, but rather … a special operation. That it is far away and will definitely not touch them.
As long as the losses were among the regular military, one could still believe in the imaginary figures. And it was much easier for Russian generals to hide losses in this case. And then – for the first time, units made up of mobilized Russians were sent to the front line. And since October, they began to suffer losses. Including because there were no clear tasks, no clear orders. BBC journalists, after talking with the Russian mobilized, describe a similar picture. I will quote – “they brought, unloaded, ordered to dig in, there were no more introductory; we sat hungry, the shelling began, there was no communication, the commander was either not there, or he was killed, what to do – it was not clear, and we began to retreat.’ On the face – and poor coordination, and too long a chain of decision-making; and in general – the lack of a clear strategy, but what to do with those who are now “in a fire order” taken into the army?
As a result – many wounded and killed among the mobilized. And the more such stories are reported home to Russia from the front line, the more likely it is that the Russians will still begin to open their eyes to what is happening. And the support of the Kremlin (which is partly ‘drawn up’ by the Russian sociologists, and partly it may actually exist) will begin to fall.
But what will happen next on the front line? And how will Russia react to these attacks; We will definitely talk in one of the new videos. Three times a week on this channel. Thanks for watching – and see you soon.
